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Resumen
En este artículo se analiza el rol que jugaron los aumentos de productividad en la desinflación que
vivió Chile en los años noventa. Se plantea que tales aumentos fueron clave para evitar los costos en
términos de menos producto que conlleva la estabilización en una economía altamente indexada.  La
desinflación entre 1990 y 1998 fue sin costo. Entre los múltiples factores —internos y externos— que
contribuyeron al buen desempeño macroeconómico, que produjo a la vez altas tasas de crecimiento e
inflación decreciente, la productividad tiene un lugar preponderante, como ilustran los resultados de
nuestra simulación
Abstract
This paper analyzes the role productivity growth had on disinflation in Chile during the 1990s. It
argues that productivity growth was key in avoiding the output costs of stabilization in a highly
indexed economy. Disinflation from the early 1990s through 1998 was costless. Among the many
external and domestic factors that contributed to good macroeconomic performance, which combined
simultaneously very high rates of growth and declining inflation, productivity stands high. The paper’s
simulation results illustrate the latter point.
_________________
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1.  Introduction
Chile enjoyed unprecedented economic success during the 1990s, in particular until
1998.  Inflation, measured at the end of the year, declined from 27.3 percent in 1990 to 4.7
percent in 1998, and in every year of the decade, the inflation rate was below that in the
previous year.  Since 1994, inflation has been in single digits, something previously seen
only on the eve of the 1982 crisis (briefly) and in the early 1960s.  Meanwhile output grew
at a record annual rate of 7.6 percent during the 1990s, which is impressive not only by
Chile’s own historical standards but by international standards as well (figure 1).  In terms
of both output growth and inflation, the decade of the 1990s was the period of highest
achievement in Chile’s modern economic history.
The surge in growth began before the decline in inflation, having started during the
recovery from the debt crisis in the mid-1980s.  Indeed, in the seventeen years from 1985 to
2002, GDP grew at an average annual rate of 6 percent. The persistent decline in inflation,
by contrast, occurred only after 1990 (figure 2).
Chile has long been a country with chronic moderate to high inflation.  Between
1960 and 1990, the average annual inflation rate was 72 percent, although that average falls
to 26 percent when the years of three-digit inflation, 1972-76, are excluded.  The slow but
persistent reduction of inflation is particularly impressive in that it was not accompanied by
output losses.  Why was disinflation so successful in Chile?  And why were there no output
costs in bringing down inflation in a country so used to high inflation?
These questions have received two different answers from economists. The first
answer claims that Chile’s success was the result of good macroeconomic policies,
including a clear commitment to reducing inflation, sound fiscal policy, and the adoption of
an inflation targeting strategy.  However, there are at least three problems with this view.
The first is that Chile’s disinflation was not just accompanied by low output costs, but by
no output costs at all.  Although the absence of output costs is consistent with a fully
credible disinflation à la Lucas and Sargent, in those models prices are fully flexible except
for informational problems, which can be overcome if there is sufficient policy credibility.
In contrast, there was a high degree of price stickiness in the Chilean economy, in particular2
through the widespread use of backward-looking indexation in labor contracts. Thus one
cannot use this model to explain a disinflation that had no output costs at all (see, for
example, De Gregorio, 1995).  Second, one also has to account for the speed of the
disinflation.  A fully credible disinflation is also a rapid one.  But the decline of inflation in
Chile was quite slow, characterized by the sluggishness in prices that is the expected result
of accommodation in an economy that has lived so long with inflation.  Finally, during this
period there was no clear subordination of macroeconomic policy to the anti-inflation
strategy.  Indeed, there were several episodes in which control of inflation was
subordinated to exchange rate policy.  In addition, the inflation target was set annually on a
declining path, recognizing the need to disinflate gradually, and the target was set at a level
consistent with inflationary trends.  This is why Chile’s inflation target was difficult to
distinguish from an inflation forecast.
  The other answer that one hears is that Chile’s successful disinflation was due to
good luck: that the fall in inflation was the result of a highly favorable external
environment, which induced a large appreciation of the peso, which in turn ultimately
drove inflation down.  (This explanation is associated with Calvo and Mendoza, 1999).
However, this view, too, is at best incomplete.  It cannot explain why, when the external
environment turned sharply negative, as it did in the early 2000s, inflation did not return to
its previous high levels.  This view fails to recognize that, given its strong macroeconomic
fundamentals, Chile should have had low inflation, and hence the issue is how it made the
transition from high to low inflation.  The existence of an independent central bank, with an
explicit mandate of price stability, was essential to inducing credibility in the declining path
of inflation.  Meanwhile the performance of fiscal policy was also very strong.  Between
1990 and 1998 gross public debt fell from 76 percent to 34 percent of GDP, and net debt
from 35 percent to 5 percent (figure 3).  Relying only on good luck to explain the success
of disinflation ignores the argument that strong growth performance was possible, among
other things, because of Chile’s sound macroeconomic policies.
I take an intermediate view, arguing that strong output growth was a necessary
condition for Chile’s gradual and costless disinflation.  The adoption of an inflation target,
coupled with strong fundamentals, provided room for achieving low inflation in the long
run, which was consistent with noninflationary backward-looking indexation.  However,3
the stickiness in wages and prices explains why the adjustment was very slow.  It is in this
context that another factor, productivity growth, played a key role in speeding disinflation,
but above all in securing the systematic reduction of inflation.  Thus one can interpret the
inflation targeting of the 1990s as a commitment to a declining path of inflation consistent
with the prevailing slow adjustment of prices.  Had productivity growth been slow, this
adjustment would not have been possible, since there was also the constraint of full lagged
wage indexation.
In this paper I simulate a simple price adjustment in the presence of full indexation of
wages to past inflation.  In such a scenario, if there is no growth, inflation reemerges, and it
is then impossible to reduce inflation without output losses.  Thus a strong growth
performance is essential to avoid the stabilization costs to legitimate the disinflation as it
comes together with strong economic and social progress. The next section of the paper
presents the framework used for the simulations, which is based on a simple productive
structure of the economy with wage indexation.  Section 3 presents the results, and section
4 concludes.
2.  The Framework
The exercise starts with the following demand function for labor (lowercase letters
indicate the logarithm of the variable, and constants are normalized to zero), all for period t:
, tt t t ylwp − =− (2.1)
where y is output, l is employment, w is nominal wages, and p is prices.  The implicit
production function is Cobb-Douglas.  This framework allows for prices to be a constant
markup over marginal costs, and, for normalization, the markup and the share of labor in
production are ignored.
I assume 100 percent lagged indexation of wages.  Nominal wages are increased by
inflation in the previous year, which in log terms implies that,
11 tt t ww π − − = + (2.2)
where π is inflation.
The wage equation captures the simple idea that wages are fully adjusted for past
inflation, but for this to be a reasonable assumption it needs further justification. If inflation4
is rising, this would not be a reasonable assumption, although here I assume a labor market
at full employment and in which real wages equal the marginal productivity of labor, so
that the issue about the level of nominal wages should be of second order.  In the
background, however, one has to recognize that wages are set on the basis of uncertain
future events.   For example, if inflation were expected to rise, it is unlikely that workers
would tolerate a deterioration in their real wages during the term of the contract, and hence
they would demand a premium.  In Chile, however, with the central bank committed to
declining inflation, the wage equation (2.2) would entail real wage gains toward the end of
the contract.  One could add a real wage drift to equation (2.2), but it would not change the
basic mechanics of the simulations.
Along similar lines, García (2003) has emphasized the distinction between expected
and unexpected productivity growth by assuming a wage equation with a drift based on
expected productivity gains.  In contrast, in equation (2.2) I assume that unforeseen events
are covered by allowing adjustment of wages based on past inflation as long as it is
expected that inflation will decline.
Solving equation (2.1) for p and subtracting prices lagged one period on both sides,
we have
111 () tt t t t t wp y l π π −−− =−+− − (2.3)
But for real wages during t - 1 we can use equation (2.1) lagged one period to arrive at
1 ˆ ˆ () tt t t yl ππ − = −− (2.4)
where a caret over the variable represents a rate of change.  I will use this as a baseline
equation for the exercises below.  However, to add more realism one needs to add the
exchange rate, as well as the possibility of a trend increase in real wages.  I incorporate
these factors in what follows.
Consider an open economy that produces traded and nontraded goods, identified by
the subscripts T and N, respectively.  A proportion α of the goods are nontraded, and the
remaining 1 - α are traded goods.5
Now consider that the inflation rate on the left-hand side of equation (2.4)
corresponds to inflation in nontraded goods (πN).  In this case we need to add to the change
in inflation the change in the real exchange rate.
We can write inflation as a weighted average of inflation in traded and inflation in
nontraded goods, with weights α and 1 - α, respectively.  In addition, the real exchange rate
(q), defined as the price of foreign goods in domestic currency (sp*) relative to the price of
domestic goods (p), can be shown to be
() TN qp p α = − , (2.5)
where the price of traded goods is pT = sp*.
It is easy to show that inflation in nontraded goods can then be written as






which, substituted into equation (2.4), leads to the following expression for inflation:
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Strictly speaking, productivity growth as in equation (2.7) should be productivity in
nontraded goods, but for the purpose of the simulations, and given some additional
assumptions, it is possible to justify the use of economy-wide productivity.
One could add some other ingredients to this formulation.  For example, one could
assume that wages are partly indexed, and partly based on expectations or the credibility of
the inflation target.  Therefore wages would increase both with past inflation and with the
inflation target: wt = wt-1+ϕπ t-1+(1 - ϕ)π*.  In addition, it is possible to link productivity to
the evolution of the real exchange rate along the lines of Balassa and Samuelson.  However,
I do not pursue these extensions, because the simulations, rather than replicating the actual
path of inflation, attempt only to show a lower bound for inflation given an extreme
assumption of total indexation.6
3.  Results
The two basic simulations are presented in figures 4 and 5.  The simulations are static;
that is, to simulate period t, I use the actual values of inflation in t - 1, since the idea is that,
at the moment contracts were indexed, all past information was known.
Two extreme assumptions are considered regarding the share of nontraded goods.  In
figure 4 I assume the economy is closed, so that all goods are nontraded.  This is the most
unfavorable scenario for the reduction of inflation, since the change in the real exchange
rate plays no role.  In the other case I assume that half of all goods are traded, in which case
(1 - α)/α is equal to 1.  This is a case of a very open economy, since, as suggested by recent
research, even traded goods have an important nontraded component, mainly in the
distribution sector.  Therefore the traded goods share is smaller than that implied by
classifying large economic sectors as traded or nontraded.  In this case the contribution of
the change in the real exchange rate to disinflation is at its maximum.
In the case of the closed economy (α = 0), figure 4 shows that, except for a couple of
minor differences, the simulated mechanical rate of inflation derived from full backward
indexation was always below actual inflation.  Therefore the inflation path was consistent
with what the economy could actually achieve.  In contrast, the dashed line shows the
simulation assuming no productivity growth.  In this case the minimum possible rate of
inflation would have been the past rate of inflation.  Of course, one would need to add
further extensions to the current framework to explain the decline in inflation over time.
But what the figure highlights is that the trajectory of inflation that occurred in the 1990s
would have not been possible as long as actual inflation was below past inflation.
The other simulation, presented in figure 5, includes the contribution of the change in
the real exchange rate to disinflation.  As expected, the minimum feasible rate of inflation
consistent with both productivity growth and the path of the real exchange rate is lower
than in the previous case.  And again, the actual path of inflation was consistent with this
lower bound.  Of course, the change in the real exchange rate was related to productivity
growth, as well as the favorable external conditions regarding the terms of trade and capital
inflows. In this exercise, however, I have considered productivity growth and the real
exchange rate channel separately.7
What is interesting to note in figure 5 is that when only the real appreciation is
considered and no productivity growth is assumed (the dashed line), disinflation would
have not been possible under full backward indexation.  This is clearly a conservative
estimate, since, as explained before, without productivity growth the appreciation would
have been lower, and hence the simulated rate of inflation would have been even higher.
The bottom line is that changes in the real exchange rate are not enough by themselves to
explain the disinflation; the increase in productivity was a necessary contributor as well.
Finally, note also in figure 5 that the deceleration of growth and the real depreciation
that have taken place in Chile since 1999 would not have allowed a further decline in
inflation if full backward indexation had still been pervasive. Two additional factors that
were not present at the beginning of the disinflation must be considered when analyzing
macroeconomic developments since 1999.  First, the decline in inflation in these years did
have output costs, as one would expect under normal circumstances, and they have allowed
a further reduction of inflation to historically low levels in Chile.  But, in addition, there is
evidence that indexation has become much less important.  Indeed, in the presence of a
high degree of full backward indexation, the output costs should have been large, since the
disinflationary effects on wages would occur in the nonindexed sector.
The deindexation process that has occurred in Chile is illustrated in figure 6.  The figure
shows average growth in wage and labor costs across six-month periods as well as inflation
during the past six months, forwarded four months ahead.  The data are smoothed using
quarterly moving averages.  Thus the figure graphically aligns wages and labor costs with
the period of past inflation that is relevant for indexation purposes since 1990.  If there
were widespread indexation, one would never observe inflation above wages and labor
costs. The figure thus suggests that indexation has been on the wane recently.  Of course,
deindexation may have started much earlier, but the recent data provide the most definitive
evidence.  As expected, indexation is a way of protecting wages in an environment of high
inflation. As inflation has come down and the economy is still below full employment,
wages have moved consistently with the inflation target, making the indexation rigidities
much less relevant. This later period coincides with the implementation of a full-fledged
inflation targeting regime, which has kept inflation low.8
4.  Concluding Remarks
This paper has made a simple point: that the successful growth performance of the
Chilean economy in the 1990s was essential to Chile’s unprecedented disinflation.
Although the decline in inflation was slow by many standards, it was not accompanied by
output costs.  Instead, just as indexation was putting constraints on the speed of,
productivity growth was at the same time relaxing those constraints.  I have used a simple
framework where there are full backward-indexation.  In general, what matters for the costs
and speed of stabilization is not indexation, but price inertia (Lefort and Schmidt-Hebbel,
2002).  In this paper, productivity growth reduces price inertia in the presence of
widespread indexation.
I do not discuss here the relationship between the inflation targets of the 1990s and the
actual reduction of inflation.  What the exercise performed here shows is that the targets
were fully consistent with the actual rigidities in the economy.  In addition, a commitment
to a persistent decline in inflation was necessary to achieve consistency between indexation
and wage setting.  Backward-looking indexation is much more difficult in an environment
were inflation is not declining.  Setting wages based on past inflation in that case implies an
increase in real wages during the term of the labor contract.
On the question of whether Chile’s disinflation was due to good luck or good policies,
one cannot deny that the 1990s were years of a very positive external environment for
emerging economies, which may have allowed for an extra growth bonus.  However,
Chile’s persistent growth is to a large extent the result of good policies and good
institutions (De Gregorio and Lee, 2003).  In particular, evidence has shown that low
inflation fosters economic growth.  But the point made here is that growth in turn can make
a great contribution to disinflation, and the Chilean experience is a good example.9
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Figure 3
Public Debt in Chile
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Figure 6
Inflation and Nominal Wages (1)
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